Much writing on party organisational development in post-communist East Central Europe has argued that, with the partial exception of successor parties to former regime parties, political parties in the region will be state-centred, low-membership organisations dominated by political elites, which loosely approximate to the 'cartel' and 'electoral-professional' models of party identified by some scholars in Western Europe. This pattern of development in East Central Europe is seen as reflecting the specific opportunity structures of post-communist societies, which both shape politicians' organisational strategies and determine available resources for party building. Using a detailed re-examination of the Czech case, this paper questions the applicability of such models. It argues that their use is problematic not simply because of inherent difficulties of model fitting, but because they underestimate the path dependent character of party organisational development in the region and, especially the extent to which viable parties appear to have drawn on organisational resources accumulated under the old regime and during transition. The combination of path dependency and post-communist opportunity structures, it is argued, tends to create hybrid party organisations, which are removed from 'electoral professional' type parties in a number of ways. The paper concludes by suggesting possible avenues for rethinking party organisational development in the region.
relatively unimportant role is played by party membership, and the dominant role of party leaders'. 4 inferior to those in both Western and Southern Europe. 10 Viewed in terms of internal power relationships too, in many cases, there is significant concentration and overlapping of party and state/parliamentary elites, who seem to enjoy significant autonomy. 11 Thus as in Poland, so in the region generally, it seems that parties 'exhibit more of the characteristics evident in contemporary models of party organisation -catch-all, electoral-professional and cartel -than those of the traditional mass party'. 12 However, when empirical data on party membership and organisation in East Central
European states is examined in detail a more complex picture emerges. While most 'new' parties descended from pre-1989 opposition groupings or formed after 1989 seem to conform to the 'electoral-professional' or 'cartel' model, former regime parties seem to retain significant aspects of traditional mass party organisation. Lewis, for example, notes 'the relative strength, organizational resilience and relatively high membership levels of former communist parties and allied organizations' as well as their good financial and material resource base. 13 
15
Although analysts disagree over the scope and importance of organisational dissimilarities between 'successor' and 'new' parties, 16 on first examination the anomaly seems a relatively simple one, explicable in terms of the 'organisational inheritance' and cultural continuity from the communist regime and, in some cases, the pre-communist period. 17 Such organisational legacies, analysts suggest, might in a limited number of cases simply 'mask or simply work against' the general, underlying tendency for East Central European parties to evolve towards the 'electoral professional' model, 18 making successor parties 'partial exceptions' to this general tendency. 19 However, close analysis of other aspects of party organisation, such as patterns of elite domination or professionalization, reveals a number of further inconsistencies. Van
Biezen's recent work on the internal power dynamics of parties in Hungary and the Czech Republic, for example, which, while highlighting the overlapping of parliamentary and party elites, suggests that party head offices not parliamentary elites are the more powerful actors. 20 Moreover, as Szczerbiak demonstrates, while Polish parties typically lack both significant mass memberships and large paid central apparatuses, there are only limited signs of the capital-intensive 'electoralprofessionalization' of party organisation and party campaigning through the buying in of media and policy expertise. 21 Analysts engaged in such fine grain research, have, therefore, tended to shy away from even qualified generalisations about the usefulness of models such 'electoralprofessional' and 'cartel' party types in East Central Europe. 22 This uneasy relationship between detailed empirical research and existing models of party suggests that some degree of re-thinking may need to take place. In the following sections, I would like to consider some possible lines which such a rethinking might follow through a detailed re-examination and reinterpretation of the Czech case.
3. The Czech Case Revisited:
As in many Central European democracies, Czech party politics has moved from a state of flux and instability following the collapse of communist rule to a semiconsolidated, programmatically-structured party system with 5-6 key actors. 23 In terms of party organisation and party-society links, the Czech case exhibits the same loosely 'electoral-professional' tendencies seen throughout the region, 24 but is unusual in that While imperfectly understood, the operation of such inheritances for 'historic' and 'successor' parties like ÈSSD and ÈSL has been widely noted. However, it also seems to be the case that successful and organisationally viable 'new' parties also draw on substantial organisational inheritances. Indeed, what is striking in this period is that, although the concept of the electoralprofessional framework party -usually referred in Czech to as the 'electoral party'
(volební strana) -was widely discussed in Czechoslovakia from at least late 1990, it was, with one exception, not consciously adopted by any important party. Moreover, the leaders of the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), the one party which did consciously seek to be a small, low membership formation based on parliamentary elites, did so not from considerations of 'electoral-professional' organisational rationality, but because of Burkian notions of representation, reflecting a neoconservative ideology developed by its intellectual founders before 1989.
The organisational strategies of all three Czech would-be Czech mass organisations of the early 1990s quickly floundered. The two historic parties' early strategies, while partially successful in recreating elements of the mass party organisation, proved wholly unrealistic and unsuccessful as a means of capturing significant loyal electorates 38 and even less successful in gaining social implantation. The People's Party, for example, despite its mass membership and socially and geographically concentrated bases of support, failed to create affiliated organisations with memberships of more than a few thousand. Civic Forum, by contrast, while highly successful both electorally and as a vehicle for mass participation, saw its founders'
'mass' organisational strategy crumble in 1990 because of a lack of traditional partymindedness on the part of its ex-dissident leaders and a failure to appreciate the need for party discipline, structures of internal democratic accountability and paid officials sufficiently quickly or clearly. 39 All such failed 'mass organisations', however, handed on organisational legacies, which were to enable and constrain the subsequent development of the three parties discussed.
Party Organisational Development and Path Dependency
The 'locking in' of aspects of initial organisation in a party's later organisational development is something which has been widely noted in relation to the historical formation of West European parties. It is implicit, for example, in Lipset and
Rokkan's thesis about the 'freezing' of West European party systems or in
Panebianco's account of party institutionalisation. 40 More recently a number of US scholars, drawing on the burgeoning 'new institutionalist' literature, have attempted to theorise party organisational development in terms of 'path dependency'. 41 The literature on post-communist East and Central Europe has seen widespread discussion of 'legacies', usually seen in terms of socio-cultural factors or regime types. 42 Such structural notions of legacies have also been applied to party system formation in the region. 43 However, despite a number of attempts to trace stages of party system evolution in post-communist Europe, analysis of the path dependent development of party organisation across these 'stages' has remained largely descriptive and ad hoc. 44 Moreover, as analysis of the Czech case suggests, the nature and influence of the legacies left by early transitional organisational strategies has been overlooked, even among authors who attempt to relate the concept of 'path dependency' to East
European party organisation. 45 elements of the organisations they evolved from and substantial elements of the 'electoral-professional' model, which post-communist social and political conditions imply is the optimal rational-efficient form for inter-party competition. 'Partial exceptions' to the 'electoral-professional' type party may therefore be the rule. I will now consider, how these how such hybrid organizational forms emerged in the Czech Republic in the 1990s. 47 While Bartonèík had assumed that the party could attract a large bloc of Christian-oriented voters relatively easily, Lux was aware that, beyond its limited traditional support bases, the party had little obvious appeal in a largely secular society, historically lukewarm towards Catholicism. This implied that to attract a sizeable electorate the party had to appeal to voters in programmatic terms, rather than relying on the automatic and organised support of a loyal traditional constituency. This shift was visible in the greater weight the party gave to centralised policy formation, as well as its adoption of a more explicit ideology (right-wing and conservative after 1990, centrist and social market after 1994). As part of broader policy objectives such as the creation of a civil society and the maintenance of 'social peace', however, the party also sought to advocate the interests of certain groupsfamilies with children, pensioners and disabled people 48 and, Lux later suggested, like the German CDU, the embryonic, Czech middle classes. 49 Under Lux, ÈSL also 'corporatist' vision of substituting for an absent civil society. They therefore hoped to create a party whose estimated membership would be in the range of 20 -60, 000 not a 'mass Leninist party' or a 'boundless' mass movement. 57 In contrast to ÈSSD and ÈSL, for whom a paid party apparatus was self-evident, political professionalism in the form of a powerful Head Office and network of regional 'managers' was also central to ODS's internal structure and ethos. 58 In the 1990s, therefore, all three parties began to approximate more to 'electoralprofessional' and 'cartel' type models as a result of internal transformations and reforms. Indeed, the tendency has been towards a scaling back of even the modest organisational goals initially set by the new wave of party transformers. Although ÈSSD membership increased slightly in the late 1990s, when the party first gained government office, memberships have remained low -below even limited goals set by party leaderships -and seem to have been largely static and, in the case of ODS stagnant, since the early 1990s with significant local activism confined to small groups within these memberships. 59 Despite ritual appeals to increase party membership, it is also clear that, once incumbent, Czech party leaders gave a low priority to building or maintaining the party organisation. Indeed, Václav Klaus's lack of interest his party work and party fund-raising after 1992 led some to remark that he would happily have dissolved ODS and re-founded it three months before the next election. 60 Such membership levels have left all three parties heavily dependent on the state for resources. 61 Indeed as early as 1991 even ÈSL's relatively large membership was insufficient to finance even the party's district apparatuses. Moreover, as internal party critics in both ODS and ÈSSD have noted, on entering government in 1992 and 1998 policy formation in both parties was effectively transferred from the party to government, depriving both party members and party managers of any real influence. 62 In both parties the overlapping of party, parliamentary and government elites has bolstered the autonomy of such elites, 63 reflecting a 'stratarchic relationship' 64 between elite and grassroots, with ordinary members largely absorbed in local parish pump politics and ignorant of, or uninterested in national politics. 65 Moreover, since the mid-1990s, tacit agreements between ODS and ÈSSD to tolerate each other's minority administrations have increasingly led the two to act in an cartellike fashion in 'colonising' public bodies and corporations, dividing senior posts between supporters of the two parties.
Party Evolution in Czech Republic
However, despite such 'electoral professional' tendencies, the three party organisations that have developed, nevertheless, embody significant legacies from the unsuccessful organisational strategies of the post-transition period that give them a more 'hybrid' quality than usually acknowledged. Firstly, however insubstantial they may appear by West European standards, the structures and organisational networks of the three parties extend considerably beyond what they require for national electoral competition or elite recruitment. Indeed, the effective redundancy of local and regional structures is arguably at the root of the 'stratarchic' tendencies and elitegrassroots tensions visible in all three parties. In the case of ODS, in particular, 'stratarchic' tendencies appear less a facet of the 'electoral professional' model per se, than a direct legacy from Civic Forum, whose regional and intermediary structures were notoriously weak.
Secondly, however removed from the day-to-day or month-to-month exercise of power, such path dependently inherited structures and/or grassroots memberships are far from merely passive appendages to powerful central leaderships. In 1997 Václav
Klaus was moved to complain of '...insufficient understanding of internal loyalty in ODS, clearly motivated by fear of some kind of diktat from the political leadership', criticising local and regional ODS organisations which 'oscillate between passivity and a tendency towards oversimplified and somewhat radical views'. In October 1997, Miloš Zeman too complained that his the Social Democratic Party's fractious regional organisations were constantly challenging the party leadership rather than recruiting new members. 66 In ODS, as in Civic Forum, district managers as paid employees of party headquarters, responsible for running district organisations, but not subordinate to them, rival and overlap elected district and regional leadership bodies, making the party's regional organisations a complex and powerful cockpit of contending interests.
Moreover, particularly at moments of party crisis, such regional and grassroots structures can exert a decisive influence on parties' internal dynamics. In ODS on several occasions in the 1990s, grassroots delegates have used Congresses to veto Klaus's proposals (over, for example, his choice of candidate Deputy Chairs).
However, in 1997-8, in the wake of an explosive party financing scandal, when he found himself politically isolated within the ODS leadership, Klaus was able to mobilise grassroots majority support to defeat his political opponents using the party's limited, but functional, democratic mechanisms at a special party Congress. ÈSSD regional organisations are also a key resource for those seeking to build or challenge the 'dominant coalition' within the party. The party's Central Bohemian organisation, for example, has proved an important base for a faction challenging the leadership of Miloš Zeman, whose leaders would otherwise be dependent on his prime ministerial largesse.
Moreover, the dynamics of candidate selection in the Czech Republic, often taken as an approximate gauge of power relations within parties, are also highly revealing. As detailed analysis of Czech parties' nomination procedures for parliamentary candidates for the 1996 and 1998 legislative elections shows, in all three parties regional and district party organisations played the key role in candidate selection. 67 Although the dominant actors were usually regional and district executives, in some cases, as in some regions in the Social Democratic Party in 1996, there was direct balloting of grassroots members. Correspondingly, there was only a limited degree of intervention in the process by national leaderships, even where, as in the case of ODS, they had wide formal powers to do so. 68 Although the regional constituencies and listbased PR used in Czech legislative elections may partly explain the relative strength of regional organisations in candidate selection, it is clear that the internal dynamics of the parties surveyed contrast markedly with those of a purer 'electoral professional' or 'business firm' party such as Italy's Forza Italia, where the 'grassroots' can be effectively and continually bypassed by party elites. The analysis presented here can also be seen as feeding into a broader stream of criticism of 'cartel' type models which see them as misstating and oversimplifying the relationship between state and civil society, and as overstating the insulation of party elites from societal, grassroots and competitive pressures. 72 In this connection, the Czech case suggests that, not only is the formation of party organisation even in East Central Europe less easily accomplished through purely elite action than is often assumed, but that, as in Western Europe, the autonomy of party elites from grassroots pressures, however inconsistently exerted, should not be overestimated.
Finally, the prevalence and the success of parties with 'hybrid' organisation suggests that the model of electoral and organisational rationality embodied in 'cartel' and 'electoral-professional' type party models may itself need more sophisticated analysis.
Hopkin and Paolucci's suggestion, for example, that strongly 'electoral-professional'
and 'business firm' parties achieve short-term electoral and organisational efficiency by trading off the longer-term organisational stability that elements of more traditional party organisation bring, may require careful consideration. The normative and cultural factors highlighted earlier also seem in need of more explicit incorporation into discussions of party organisational development. For, while parties organised on increasingly 'electoral-professional', 'cartel' or 'business firm' lines might be formidable rational-efficient engines for electoral competition, party-voter linkage, and even governance, this case study suggests that even in a region with strong antiparty traditions as East Central Europe, such streamlined elite creations may lack the deeper cultural and historical legitimacy still accruing to mass organisational forms.
